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Background: In 2002, China launched the largest public health insurance scheme in the world, the New
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS). It is intended to enable rural populations to access health care services,
and to curb medical impoverishment. Whether the scheme can reach its equity goals depends on how it is used,
and by whom. Our goal is to shed light on whether and how income levels affect the ability of members to reap
insurance benefits.
Methods: We exploit primary panel data consisting of a complete census (over 3500 individuals) in three villages
in Puding County, Guizhou province, collected in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. Data was collected during in-person
interviews with household member(s). The data include yearly gross and net medical expenses for all individuals,
and socio-economic information. We apply probit, ordinary least squares, and tobit multivariate regression analyses
to the three waves in which NCMS was active (2006, 2009 and 2011). Explained variables include obtainment, levels
and rates of NCMS reimbursement. Household income is the main explanatory variable, with household- and
individual-level controls. We restrict samples to rule out self-selection, and exploit the 2009 NCMS reform to
highlight equity-enhancing features of insurance.
Results: Prior to 2009 reforms, higher income in our sample was statistically significantly related to higher
probability of obtaining reimbursement, as well as higher levels and rates of reimbursement. These relations
all disappear after the reform, suggesting lower-income households were better able to reap insurance benefits
after the scheme was reformed. Regression results suggest this is partly explained by reimbursement for chronic
diseases.
Conclusions: The post-reform NCMS distributed benefits more equitably in our study area. Making health insurance
pro-poor may require a focus on outpatient costs, credit constraints and chronic diseases, rather than catastrophic
illnesses.
Keywords: NCMS, Reimbursement, Medical inequality, Public policyBackground
Public health insurance schemes often have pro-poor
motives. Among their stated goals is to help provide
health services to those who cannot afford them. Justifi-
cations for this range from the ethical (access to health-
care is on the United Nations list of basic human rights),
to the epidemiological (preventing outbreaks requires
keeping everyone healthy) to the economic (a healthy* Correspondence: zhangyumei2006@126.com
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unless otherwise stated.labor force is more productive). Yet designing a health
insurance scheme that is pro-poor is not straightforward,
and success in that respect depends on how the scheme
is used, and by whom. If the wealthy benefit more than
the poor from an insurance scheme, then public funds
are perhaps not being used optimally, or at least not
consistently with the scheme’s intentions. To make
health insurance pro-poor, it is crucial to understand
what kind of scheme allows the poor to reap the health-
care benefits they need. This paper sheds some light on
these questions in the context of rural China, by analyz-
ing the relationship between incomes and healthcare
expenditure reimbursements.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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sive and complex [1], and much attention has been given
to documenting and measuring health inequity [2]. Econo-
mists have studied income-related inequality in health out-
comes across countries [3] or within populations [4–6];
income-related inequality in the use of healthcare services
[7, 8] or healthcare expenditures [9–11]. The inequalities
they highlighted provide much of the justification for pro-
poor public health insurance schemes.
Work on the relationships between poverty and health
insurance has usually focused on one of two questions:
whether insurance allows the poor to access health services
[12, 13], and whether it prevents medical impoverishment
[14–16]. Much of this literature uses identification strat-
egies based enrollment into insurance schemes [17–19], or
on the size of user fees [20, 21]. Such work needs to over-
come a number of econometric hurdles [22] that can cast
doubt on the validity of estimates, such as the fact that less
healthy individuals may self-select into insurance schemes,
that the rich and the poor may have different types of
health issues, or that the cost of health services may vary
with demand. If health issues vary with income, the use of
specific healthcare services may not be a good measure of
how pro-poor an insurance scheme is.
We avoid many of those pitfalls by focusing on the rela-
tionship between incomes and healthcare reimbursements.
Reimbursements can be seen as a measure of how “pro-
poor” the policy is, irrespectively of issues of endogenous
healthcare needs and costs. A “pro-poor” policy would be
designed and targeted in a way that already accounts for
those issues, so as to provide the poor with reimburse-
ments. We can thus ask the simple question of whether ac-
cess to reimbursement is income dependent. We use a
unique dataset from China to answer this question.
China runs the world’s largest network of basic medical
insurance, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NCMS). The NCMS offers a unique opportunity to study
health insurance schemes because, where it exists, it is vir-
tually universal and exclusive: we need not worry about
self-selection or about payments from private insurance
schemes. The question is not so much whether the poor
can get insurance coverage, but rather whether they are
able to benefit from what their health insurance has to
offer. Launched in 2002, NCMS was gradually expanded
to cover almost all rural areas today.¹ We use panel data
from three villages in Puding county, Guizhou province,
to test whether NCMS is meeting its equity goals. We
take advantage of program reforms that took place in
2009 to investigate the ingredients of pro-poor health
insurance.
NCMS and its reforms
The government began NCMS trials in select counties
in 2002. The program grew rapidly. From 40 millionparticipants in 2004 [23], the number of enrolled
reached about 832 million by 2011, with a 97 % enroll-
ment rate [24]. NCMS is jointly financed by govern-
ments and participants. The share of government
subsidy was about 75 % in total NCMS funding in 2011.
In the early years of the scheme, coverage was limited to
inpatient services, with the goal of relieving the burden of
catastrophic illnesses and accidents [25]. Reimbursement
rates were relatively low, and the reimbursement process
was discouragingly complex [26]. Governments continued
to reform NCMS year by year, increasing both the breadth
of coverage (types of reimbursable expenses) and the
depth of coverage (reimbursement rates and ceilings), but
also raising premiums and subsidy costs to central and
local governments. The average government subsidy for
NCMS enrollees increased tenfold since the inception
of the scheme, from 20 RMB to 200 RMB per person
per year; total public expenses reached 242.9 billion
RMB [27]. The insurance was used in 1.3 billion in-
stances nationwide during 2011, 1.6 times per enrollee
on average [28]. The program and its various reforms
were all implemented gradually throughout the coun-
try, such that program timelines vary by province and
even by county.
In Guizhou province in particular, NCMS trials started
in 2005, followed by overall implementation in 2008.
The number of rural households who participated in
NCMS increased from 2.26 million in 2005 to 30.74
million in 2011, and the share of participants within pro-
gram locations rose from 63 to 97 % of the population.
The total premium per person (including government
subsidy) was increased from 30 RMB in 2005 to 140
RMB in 2010, and 230 RMB in 2011. Only a fraction of
this premium is paid by enrollees themselves: 10 RMB
from 2004 to 2007, 20 RMB in 2008 and 30 RMB in
2009–2011. The government’s total NCMS expenditure
in Guizhou increased from 43.6 million RMB in 2005 to
5,225 million RMB in 2011. The number of reimburse-
ments was increased from 1.32 million instances in 2005
to 44 million instances in 2011. The average reimburse-
ment rate for inpatient expenses was raised from 46.6 in
2008 to 56.8 % in 2011 [29].
In Puding county where our data comes from, the pro-
gram started in 2006, and at first only covered inpatient
services. Reimbursement of general outpatient expenses
and large expenses related to select chronic diseases
was implemented in 2009. Instantaneous reimburse-
ment was also launched in that year, relieving patients
from the need to front their medical costs. The year
2009 thus marks a major reform of NCMS in Puding,
expanding the coverage beyond hospitalizations and
implementing simultaneous reimbursement. We exploit
these reforms to explore the relationships between in-
come and NCMS benefits.
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Given its scale and ambitions, the NCMS has been
widely studied, particularly in the national literature.
Most studies of the impact of NCMS focus on access to
care and on medical expenditures [19, 26, 30–34].
The few studies that consider the effects of NCSM on
poverty and inequality differ in their conclusions. Xu
and collaborators [35] suggest NCMS alleviated disease-
related poverty using a survey of poor households in
Zhejiang province. Qi [36] also suggests that the NCSM
significantly decreased the poverty rate at the household
and provincial levels, raised incomes for low and middle
income households, and reduced inequality within vil-
lages. Tan and Zhong [37] focus, as we do, on the distri-
bution of reimbursements, and find that low income
groups received higher reimbursements from NCMS
than high income groups. Conversely, other researchers
show that out-of-pocket health payments remain a se-
vere burden for rural households, and financial protec-
tion from the NCMS is limited [38]. Others suggest the
NCMS suffers from poor design and inefficiencies, and
fails to protect against impoverishment [25, 30].
One reason for such diverging results is that NCMS
was reformed several times during its ten years of exist-
ence, with reform schedules varying from one county to
the next. Therefore, the single- or two-period cross sec-
tional methods used in existing studies can be looking at
widely different versions of the NCMS in terms of cover-
age, premiums, and reimbursement rates. In this paper
we partly reconcile the literature by identifying how the
equity outcomes of NCMS change after the reform.
Methods
The puding panel dataset
This paper uses a census-type rural household panel
with a total of four waves, of which we primarily use
three in the analysis, as the baseline predates NCMS im-
plementation. Data was collected in 2004 (pre-NCMS),
and again in 2006, 2009 and 2011. The data cover three
administrative villages in Puding County, Guizhou Prov-
ince, Southwestern China.² The three villages lie within
10 km of the county seat. This dataset has the advantage
of covering every household in the area. As a complete
census, this dataset is uniquely adapted to studying
questions of inequality, because unlike with drawn sam-
ples we can be sure that the data captures any year-on-
year changes in income distribution. The sample size is
about 800 households in each year and 3500 individuals
in each wave of the panel, for a total of n = 14469 obser-
vations (after 48 individuals were removed due to miss-
ing or corrupt data. No entire household was removed).
All households are tracked in all 4 years of data, except for
those who left the area, newly formed households (by
former members of another household) or householdswho migrated into the area. Approval and funding for data
collection was obtained from the Chinese National Sci-
ence Foundation, without additional ethical review re-
quirements for the collection of economic data.
The Puding panel surveys collected health status, med-
ical expenditures, and medical insurance reimburse-
ments for each household member of each home in the
three villages. We have yearly data at the individual level,
but not at the “health event” level: we know how much
was spent on medical care for each person, but not how
many times they saw a doctor or what treatment they re-
ceived each time. We do have variables reflecting disease
type and location of treatment for the most notable oc-
currence in the past year, and whether an individual suf-
fers from any chronic disease. In addition, the dataset
provides detailed individual demographics, employment
information, household expenditures and income etc.
Linking health and economic information in the survey
allows us to analyze the impacts of NCMS on poverty and
inequality, as well as to identify which socio-economic
groups benefit from the insurance.
Table 1 reports statistics from our sample. This region
is among the poorest and most unequal in China; Pud-
ing is on the government’s official list of “impoverished”
counties. Villagers depend heavily on agriculture, even
though land is scarce and soils are poor. Poverty is high
but decreasing: using the 2004 national poverty line of
668 RMB per person per day and measures of deflated
income (to 2004 RMB), the poverty rate decreased from
26 to 15.6 % between 2004 and 2011. Using the inter-
national dollar-a-day poverty line yields different poverty
rates, but also points to sharply decreasing poverty.³ In-
equality, however, rose in that same period: the Gini co-
efficient increased from 0.41 to 0.55.
The number of households in the sample increased
somewhat over the period, reaching 900 in 2011. The
composition of the population also evolved somewhat,
primarily due to migration of workers. The proportion of
households with migrants increased from 36.7 to 41.9 %,
which was accompanied by an increase in the share of eld-
erly population rising from 7.0 to 9.6 %. Such shifts in the
population are the reason why it is necessary to approach
health-related questions with a regression framework that
can control for them.
The NCMS was not active in this county at the time of
the first survey wave in 2004. The second wave (2006) was
the first year surveyed households could enroll in NCMS,
with 82 % of households participating. Participation rose
to 98 % and 95 % in 2009 and 2011, respectively.⁴ Pre-
miums increased dramatically, from 45 RMB to 230 RMB,
but most of this is publically sponsored, so that the share
owed by farmers remains a small fraction of that (10–30
RMB). High participation rates suggest that self-selection
into enrollment is not a major concern in this context.
Table 1 Survey summary statistics
2004 2006 2009 2011
General demographics and statistics
Number of households 795 817 862 900
Population (persons) 3380 3418 3698 4034
Household size(persons)+ 4.50 4.34 4.45 4.57
Per capita net income (2004 RMB) 1403 1859 2420 3239
Poverty incidence (%)# 26.2 % 31.3 % 23.2 % 15.6 %
Gini coefficient 0.41 0.52 0.57 0.55
Share of population in labor force (%) 65.2 % 62.3 % 62.4 % 63.5 %
Share of population 60 or older (%) 7.0 % 7.6 % 8.1 % 9.6 %
Number of migrants per HH(persons)+ 0.45 0.73 0.73 0.87
Share of households with migrants (%) 36.7 % 39.3 % 43.4 % 41.9 %
Per capita net income (2004 RMB) 1403 1859 2420 3239
Health statistics
Population share enrolled in NCMS (%) na 82 % 98 % 95 %
NCMS premium na 45 100 230
Of which: premium paid by enrollees (RMB) na 10 30 30
Percent sought treatment^ na 56 % 60 % 45 %
Percent received reimbursement (of treated) na 14 % 55 % 39 %
Percent reporting a chronic disease^ na 18 % 19 % 17 %
Puding panel.+: Average value. #:2004 official poverty line = 668RMB per person-year. ^Not available or not comparable in 2004 survey
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enrollees benefit from the scheme. The table also shows
that the share of population seeking treatment fluctuates
between 45 % and 60 %. The percentage of those receiving
reimbursement went from 14 % in 2006 to 60 % in 2009
to 39 % in 2011. These fluctuations suggest that disease
patterns and prevalence are not stable from one year to
the next. This is one of the reasons why we focus on the
relationship between income and NCMS benefits rather
than looking at specific treatments received, which are
likely to be heavily influenced by fluctuating environmen-
tal factors.
Empirical framework
We use a regression framework to assess whether in-
come bears relation to benefits an individual reaps from
NCMS. While benefits are individual, not all patients are
income earners, such that it makes sense to pool income
at the household level. The relation we are trying to test
can be expressed in the following generic equation:
benefitsi;t ¼ f Zi;t ; Xh;t;Tt ; incomeh;t
 
Where Zi,t is a vector of individual characteristics, Xh,t
a vector of household characteristics, Tt a series of year
dummies, and household income is expressed per capita.
Year dummies capture the year-specific mean shifts. We
can divide the sample into two periods: pre-reform(2006) and post-reform (2009, 2011), so as to highlight
reform impacts. Similarly, in some specifications we add
a reform-income interaction term to the right-hand side,
to capture the fact that income affects benefits differ-
ently before and after the reform.
Many NCMS-related outcomes could be used on the
left-hand side, such as use of healthcare services or out-
of-pocket payments; indeed such variables are often used
in the literature on health insurance. However, such out-
comes are inherently reflective of healthcare needs that
may vary with income, in which case “inequality cannot
be interpreted as inequity” [2]. Using measures of reim-
bursement allows to eliminate confounding factors.
We use three measures of benefits: a reimbursement
dummy (binary variable for having received reimburse-
ment), the amount of reimbursement received, and the rate
of reimbursement (reimbursement/total cost). Depending
on the explained variable, we restrict the sample to those
who sought medical care or to those who received reim-
bursement, in order to eliminate concerns about (self-) se-
lection processes.⁵ If, among those who sought medical
care, individuals from higher income strata are more likely
to obtain reimbursement than poorer ones, it may indicate
that the breadth of coverage is not well targeted to the
needs of the poor. If, among those who received reim-
bursement, the wealthier tend to receive higher payments
or higher reimbursement rates, it suggests that the depth
of coverage is not well targeted to the needs of the poor.
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Table 2 summarizes all relevant variables, with means and
standard deviations. The reimbursement dummy is equal
to 1 if an individual received any NCMS reimbursement
during a given year. We also compute the amount of re-
imbursement received in a year expressed in log, and the
fraction of costs reimbursed in a year.
The key independent variable is the natural log of non-
transfer income (no household reported zero income).
Total non-transfer income was computed using exhaustive
information on all sources of income: agricultural produc-
tion and/or sales, salaries, wage work and odd jobs, gifts
and remittances, income from rents, profits from trade, ser-
vice provision, and non-farm enterprises of all sorts.
Computing incomes from agriculture required calcu-
lating the value of output and netting out all costs. Out-
put outliers were identified and corrected on the basis of
yield: where recorded output-per-hectare was unrealis-
tically high, the average yield in the village was used to
compute a new output estimate. Own consumption of
agricultural output was valued at farmgate prices, which
were culled from sales data. Cost data collected in theTable 2 Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variab
Variable Description
Dependent variables
Reimbursement dummy 1 if reimbursement is greater than zero;
Reimbursement amount The log of net reimbursement (2004 RM
Reimbursement rate Ratio of NCMS reimbursement to total h
Independent variables at the household level
Non-transfer income Per-capita Non-government income (200
Transfer income Per capita income from government tran
(non-NCMS) (2004 RMB)
Household size Excludes long-term migrants
Debt dummy 1 if household carries debt at the end of
Farming type 1 if Head relies exclusively on farming, 2
3 if rely partly on farming, 0 otherwise
Ethnicity 1 if Head ethnicity is Han,0 otherwise
Independent variables at the individual level
Self-reported Health Status 1 if great, 2 if good, 3 if poor, 4 if very p
Member of NCMS 1 if yes, 0 if not
Sex 1 if male, 0 if female
Age 1 age < 10, 2 if 10 < =age < 40, 3 if age >
Education Education type: 1 if primary or less; 2 if m
3 if senior school or above
Marriage 1 if single, 2 if married,3 if divorced or ot
Diagnostic place b 1 if village or town hospital; 2 if county o
hospital; 3 if others.
Treatment type b 1 if self-treatment; 2 if other informal,3 if
Chronic disease c 1 if individual reports a chronic disease,
Puding Panel dataset. a: Summing all 4 years of data b: Refers to most significant in
blood pressure, Arthritis, Hepatitis, Gastric ulcer, Deformity, Lumbar disk degeneratiquestionnaire was exhaustive and highly disaggregated,
including totals spent on seed, fertilizer and other che-
micals, irrigation, labor, and mechanized inputs and fuel.
Any costs incurred in kind (for instance, seed borrowed
from neighbors) was also valued in the questionnaire
and therefore easy to incorporate into our calculations.
Costs of livestock breeding activities included feed,
medicine, labor, veterinary services, and costs of machin-
ery and fuel. Enterprise profits are computed as revenues
net of costs, both of which are reported by the respon-
dents for each activity they engage in. Summing income
from all these sources yields total non-transfer income.
Income coming from government transfers is included in
the regressions separately, as it could possibly be an indi-
cator of poverty rather than wealth, since government
transfers are often targeted at those who need them most.
This is done as a precaution and helps avoid confusion in
the interpretation of results, but does not significantly
alter them. Transfer income is also expressed in natural
log (with 1 RMB added to ensure no missing values).
Running specifications at the individual level allows us
to control for self-reported health status (coded on a 1-les, pooling years 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011
Observations a Mean Standard Dev
0 otherwise 14469 0.149 0.356
B) 14469 0.707 1.832
ealthcare cost 6554 0.177 0.283
4 RMB) 14148 7.142 1.130
sfers 14468 2.518 2.750
14469 5.063 1.954
the year, 0 if not 14517 0.577 0.494
if do not farm, 14158 1.436 0.911
14469 0.641 0.480
oor 14469 2.343 1.319
11089 0.86 0.35
14469 0.529 0.499
=40 14469 2.139 0.681
iddle school; 14469 1.337 0.579
her 14469 1.469 0.585
r provincial 7017 2.172 0.857
saw formal doctor 7793 2.408 0.806
0 if not 14469 0.134 0.341
stance within survey year c: Includes Cardio-vascular diseases, Diabetes, High
on, or others as assessed by respondent
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include indicator variables for usual diagnostic place and
type of treatment, and, in some specifications, a dummy
for NCMS membership. We include household-level con-
trols for farmer households, ethnic minority households,
and household size. Some specifications also include a
dummy for chronic diseases, and for weather the house-
hold was in debt at the end of the previous year.
Model Specifications
Depending on which variable is on the left-hand side, we
run the regressions as probit models, as ordinary least
squares (OLS), or as tobit models. Probit regression is
appropriate when the explained variable is binary, such
as our reimbursement indicator. Probit regression coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as impacts on the probability
to receive reimbursement. For continuous variables such
as reimbursement amounts or reimbursement rates, we
can use OLS regressions. To eliminate confounding fac-
tors, we run OLS only on the subsample of householdsTable 3 Income and the probability of getting reimbursement
Dependent Variable: Reimbursement Dummy (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Probit models P1
Three waves wi
Years 2006, 2009, 201
Non-transfer income (ln)a 0.031e
−1.831







NCMS member dummy 0.794c
−8.033
SRHS = 2 dummy 0.012
−0.237
SRHS = 3 dummy 0.240c
−4.51





Puding panel data excluding 2004 (pre-NCMS). Sample restricted to those who sou
marital status, minority status, farmer status, household size, village, place of diagno
see Table 2. a: Transfer refers to income received under any local or national govern
Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectivelywho received NCMS reimbursement. This leads to a
relatively small sample size in 2006 (n = 246 in 2006,
n = 1792 post-reform). An alternative way of controlling
for confounding factors without restricting the sample is
to use tobit specifications [39]. This assumes that the
distribution of reimbursements is left-censored at zero,
and allows for the underlying process governing the
amount of reimbursement to be different from the one
determining whether any reimbursement was actually
received. We run tobits on the larger sample of all those
who had medical expenses (1720 observations in 2006).
All data compilation and analysis was conducted using
the Stata software, regressions made use of the reg, pro-
bit and tobit commands native to the software.
Results
Equity in obtaining reimbursement
Table 3 documents the relationship between income
levels and the probability of getting reimbursement
under NCMS with probit regressions, on the full sampleP2 P3 P4
th NCMS Pre-reform Post-Reform Three waves, with interaction terms






















ght treatment. All specifications include controls for sex, age, education,
stic and type of treatment used this year. SRHS = self-reported health status,
mental programs other than NCMS. b: Overall model fit statistics. c, d, e:
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regression using all three years when NCMS was avail-
able (2006, 2009 and 2011). In this specification, the co-
efficient on our income variable of interest (0.031) is
positive and significant at the 10 % level. Higher transfer
income (from other public programs) is associated with
higher probability of receiving reimbursement under
NCMS, possibly indicating that some households are
better informed about public transfer opportunities in
general, or better able to take advantage of them. The
2009 and 2011 dummies are significant, which suggests
that overall reimbursement was easier after the reform.
The specification controls for NCMS membership (which
is positive and significant), to ensure that we are not ob-
serving an enrollment effect.⁶ Poor self-reported health
status (3 and 4) also increases the probability of getting re-
imbursement, even though we restricted the sample to
those who received medical attention. This may reflect the
fact that those with poor health sought medical attention
more often during the year, thus increasing the chance
that they will receive reimbursement at one of those occa-
sions at least.
Column P1 thus suggests that higher-income house-
holds have a better chance of obtaining PSNP reimburse-
ment when they need it, which questions the pro-poor
nature of the policy. However, a more subtle picture ap-
pears when we run the probit regressions separately for
the pre-reform year (2009) and the post-reform years
(2009 and 2011). The 2006 probit (P2) displays a positive
and strongly significant coefficient on income, but the co-
efficient in the post-reform probit (2009 and 2011, P3) is
not significantly different from zero. This suggests that
richer households had an easier time securing reimburse-
ment for their medical expenses in 2006, but not in 2009
and 2011, after the reform. Column P4 uses all treatment-
seekers and adds a reform-income interaction term. It
shows income is positively associated with a probability of
reimbursement (0.144, significant at the 1 % level), but
most of this disappears in the reform years (-0.135, also
significant at the 1 % level). It appears NCMS reforms
changed the relationship between income and access to
reimbursement.
Equity in reimbursement amounts and rates
Table 4 reports regressions of the amount of reimburse-
ment received under NCMS by an individual during the
year. We report three ordinary least-squares regressions
(OLS) using the sample of those who received reim-
bursement under NCMS, and three tobit regressions on
the sample of treatment-seekers, using the same control
variables as in Table 3. We run OLS specifications. Col-
umns R1 and R2 respectively restrict the sample to pre-
reform (2006) and post-reform (2009 and 2011). Column
R3 pools the three NCMS years of data, and includesthe reform-income interaction term. The coefficients on
income in columns R1 and R2 are of opposite signs:
positive before the reform (0.138, not significant), nega-
tive after (−0.056, significant at 5 %). Column R3 con-
firms those signs, with a positive and significant sign on
the log of income, but a negative and significant coeffi-
cient on the interaction term. These signs are consistent
with a scenario where richer individuals tended to re-
ceive higher NCMS reimbursements in 2006, but smaller
payments after the reform. This suggests that the reform
may have made NCMS more progressive.
Columns T1, T2 and T3 repeat the same respective
specifications as R1 R2 and R3, using tobit instead of OLS,
and the larger sample. Specification T1 shows a positive
and strongly significant coefficient on income (0.929), but
in specification T2 this coefficient is very small and insig-
nificant (0.03). Column T3 bolsters significance across all
coefficients of interest.
It may be that lower-income villagers receive smaller re-
imbursement amounts (in 2006) because they use the
medical system less intensively than richer ones. To verify
this, we run all the same specifications again, but with the
rate of reimbursement (reimbursement/cost) as the ex-
plained variable. Results are presented in Table 5. The re-
sults are very similar to those of Table 4 in terms of
significance of coefficients. In 2006, the rich were getting
a greater share of their medical expenditures reimbursed,
but not after the reform. Both 2009 and 2011 year dum-
mies appear significantly positive, consistent with the fact
that the reform increased the reimbursement rate for
many diseases.
Exploring impact channels
Several mechanisms may be underlying the relationship
between incomes and reimbursements. We already con-
trol for usual place of diagnostic and treatment type, so
those are not likely to be the main drivers of what we
observe. Two of the main clauses of the 2009 reforms
were the reimbursement of outpatient care, and the im-
plementation of a simultaneous reimbursement system.
Both of these provide impact channels that could explain
our results, and our data can provide partial clues as to
whether those mechanisms are at work here.
The poor and the wealthy may be vulnerable to (or seek
treatment for) different types of diseases, which may be
covered differently by the insurance. If lower-income
people were disproportionately in need of outpatient care,
the 2009 reform would allow them to obtain more reim-
bursement, more often, consistently with our results. Al-
though we do not have detailed information on health
conditions of individuals, we do know whether or not they
suffer from a chronic disease. Since the treatment of many
chronic diseases requires outpatient services rather than
hospitalization, controlling for chronic disease may pick
Table 4 Income and the amount of reimbursement
Dependent Variable: Ln of reimbursement amount received (2004 RMB)
Model Ordinary least squares Tobit
Specification R1 R2 R3 T1 T2 T3
Pre-reform Post-Reform Three waves, with
interaction terms
Pre-reform Post-Reform Three waves, with
interaction terms
2006 2009, 2011 2006, 2009, 2011 2006 2009, 2011 2006, 2009, 2011
Non-transfer income (ln)a 0.138 −0.056d 0.254c 0.929c 0.03 0.750c
−1.351 (−1.987) −2.596 −3.483 −0.42 −4.143
(Reform dummy) x (Non-transfer income)a −0.316c −0.764c
(−3.123) (−3.948)
Transfer incomea 0.008 −0.005 −0.013 0.442c 0.057 0.083d
−0.14 (−0.345) (−0.882) −2.789 −1.474 −2.189
2009 dummy . 2.732c . 10.708c
. −3.723 . −7.695
2011 dummy 0.464c 3.217c −0.845c 9.691c
−6.01 −4.371 (−4.564) −6.928
NCMS member dummy 11.965c 1.864c 3.647c
−5.15 −3.658 −8.397
SRHS = 2 dummy 0.373 0.124 0.134 0.218 0.108 0.15
−1.149 −1.446 −1.615 −0.276 −0.508 −0.721
SRHS = 3 dummy 0.663d 0.741c 0.727c 2.595c 1.313c 1.483c
−2.141 −8.306 −8.478 −3.192 −5.808 −6.706
SRHS = 4 dummy −0.683d 0.628 −0.098 0.466 3.644c 1.332c
(−2.464) −1.609 (−0.549) −0.644 −3.304 −3.438
N 246 1792 2038 1720 3741 5461
R-squaredb 0.440 0.294 0.300
Chi-squaredb 253.03 550.57 1392.6
P-statb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Puding panel data excluding 2004 (pre-NCMS). R1, R2, R3: sample restricted to those who received reimbursement; T1, T2, T3: sample restricted to those who
sought treatment. All specifications include controls for sex, age, education, marital status, minority status, farmer status, household size, village, place of
diagnostic and type of treatment used this year. SRHS = self-reported health status, see Table 2. a: Transfer refers to income received under any local or national
governmental programs other than NCMS. b: Overall model fit statistics. c, d, e: Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively
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13 % of the sample.
Cash constraints could also explain our results. Even if
they expect reimbursement, cash constrained patients
may be unwilling or unable to disburse the insured share
of costs. Simultaneous reimbursement alleviates the need
for cash upfront. We can use indebtedness to proxy for
how cash-constrained a household is. Over half of the
sample reported carrying debt at the end the year.
Table 6 presents regression results using the same
specifications as presented so far, with two additional
dummy variables: an indicator for whether the individual
suffers from chronic illnesses, and another for whether
their household carried outstanding debt at the end of
the previous year. We use the lagged debt variable be-
cause current-year debt may be resulting from medicalexpenditures, which would confuse the interpretation of
coefficients.⁷
Results show that the reform made a significant differ-
ence for people with chronic diseases. Having a chronic
disease made people 20 % less likely to obtain reimburse-
ment before 2006, but 19 % more likely after the reform
(columns 1 and 2). The tobit specifications suggest that
the NCMS only increases the amounts reimbursed after
the reform (significant 1.162 in column 6, but negative in-
significant in column 5). If we restrict the sample to those
who received reimbursement in 2006 (and thus were hos-
pitalized), a chronic disease does increase the reimburse-
ment amounts, which may be reflecting the severity of
their condition (column 3). However, the coefficient be-
comes larger and more significant after the reform (col-
umn 4). Columns 7 and 8 show no significant impact, but
Table 5 Income and the rate of reimbursement (restricted samples)
Dependent Variable: Rate of reimbursement received
Model Ordinary least squares Tobit
R1’ R2’ R3’ T1’ T2’ T3’
Pre-reform Post-Reform Three waves, with
interaction terms
Pre-reform Post-Reform Three waves, with
interaction terms
2006 2009, 2011 2006, 2009, 2011 2006 2009, 2011 2006, 2009, 2011
Non-transfer income (ln)a 0.034e −0.005 0.032d 0.107c 0.006 0.090c
−1.856 (−1.341) −2.329 −3.769 −0.663 −4.177
(Reform dummy) x (Non-transfer income)a −0.036c −0.088c
(−2.600) (−3.860)
Transfer incomea −0.007 0.004d 0.003e 0.045c 0.010d 0.013c
(−0.687) −2.135 −1.69 −2.689 −2.188 −2.829
2009 dummy . 0.405c . 1.280c
. −3.978 . −7.778
2011 dummy −0.020e 0.386c −0.144c 1.117c
(−1.937) −3.78 (−6.513) −6.753
NCMS member dummy 1.255c 0.219c 0.409c
−4.965 −3.596 −8.045
SRHS = 2 dummy 0.02 0.001 0.002 0 0.004 0.007
−0.34 −0.081 −0.179 −0.002 −0.162 −0.288
SRHS = 3 dummy −0.013 0.008 0.005 0.221d 0.102c 0.118c
(−0.233) −0.644 −0.393 −2.553 −3.748 −4.548
SRHS = 4 dummy −0.077 0.056 −0.048e 0.046 0.428c 0.136c
(−1.542) −1.07 (−1.957) −0.596 −3.247 −2.987
N 246 1792 2038 1720 3741 5461
R-squaredb 0.162 0.025 0.095
Chi-squaredb 215.942 435.247 1316.162
P-statb 0.012 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Puding panel data excluding 2004 (pre-NCMS). R1’, R2’, R3’: sample restricted to those who received reimbursement; T1’, T2’, T3’: sample restricted to those who
sought treatment. All specifications include controls for sex, age, education, marital status, minority status, farmer status, household size, village, place of
diagnostic and type of treatment used this year. SRHS = self-reported health status, see Table 2. a: Transfer refers to income received under any local or national
governmental programs other than NCMS. b: Overall model fit statistics. c, d, e: Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively
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diseases received significantly lower reimbursement
rates before the reform (−0.13), but higher rates there-
after (0.089).
The lagged debt variable appears negative in all speci-
fications, and significant in some (columns 2, 6 and 10).
The negative sign confirms that cash-constrained house-
holds find it harder to benefit from NCMS. Debt makes
patients who sought treatment less likely to receive re-
imbursement. Debtors who do receive reimbursement
get smaller amounts, and lower reimbursement rates.
This may seem surprising, since cash constraints should
incentivize patients to seek reimbursable treatments.
However, this could also reflect the fact that cash con-
strained households simply do not seek care for expen-
sive conditions. The fact that coefficients on debt are
larger and more significant after the reform suggests that“simultaneous reimbursement” has not fully solved the
issue of cash constraints and healthcare.
Discussion
With respect to our analysis of NCMS, the uniqueness
of this dataset stems from its panel nature and the infor-
mation it gathers about health expenditures and reim-
bursements. A majority of studies of NCMS rely on
cross-section data or 2-year panels. In contrast our data
offers three waves of panel and span 5 years of NCMS
existence, with a major reform in that period. This al-
lows us to look beyond impacts of NCMS existence itself
and start honing in on specific provisions of the policy.
In addition, this dataset is a complete census, with data
on every single household in the area, which avoids all
issues related to sampling. Health information is re-
corded for every member of the household, which is
Table 6 Specifications including controls for chronic diseases and cash constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model Probit Probit Ols Ols Tobit Tobit Ols Ols Tobit Tobit
Dependent variable: Reimbursement […] Dummy Dummy Amount (ln) Amount (ln) Amount (ln) Amount (ln) Rate Rate Rate Rate
Period Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Years 2006 2009,2011 2006 2009,2011 2006 2009,2011 2006 2009,2011 2006 2009,2011
Non-transfer income (ln) a 0.170c −0.003 0.169 −0.056e 1.063c −0.053 0.038e −0.004 0.118c −0.003
−3.504 (−0.157) −1.545 (−1.834) −3.682 (−0.660) −1.964 (−0.883) −4 (−0.355)
Transfer incomea 0.074c 0.018 −0.013 −0.003 0.407d 0.066 −0.006 0.005d 0.041d 0.011d
−2.66 −1.608 (−0.227) (−0.194) −2.496 −1.499 (−0.597) −2.12 −2.504 −2.168
Chronic disease −0.205e 0.191c 0.415e 0.569c −1.035 1.162c −0.02 −0.004 −0.130e 0.089c
(−1.757) −2.98 −1.74 −5.708 (−1.532) −4.585 (−0.461) (−0.288) (−1.869) −2.944
Debt from last year −0.006 −0.147c −0.286 −0.117 −0.045 −0.660c −0.014 0.006 −0.003 −0.065c
(−0.063) (−2.893) (−1.405) (−1.501) (−0.084) (−3.293) (−0.375) −0.609 (−0.057) (−2.697)
NCMS member dummy 1.879c 0.612c 11.459c 2.523c 1.163c 0.311c
−4.74 −4.082 −4.88 −4.07 −4.763 −4.188
2011 dummy −0.279c 0.449c −0.831c −0.012 −0.138c
(−5.520) −5.565 (−4.113) (−1.097) (−5.719)
SRHS = 2 dummy 0.043 0.019 0.356 0.111 0.39 0.104 0.007 0.006 0.021 0.01
−0.306 −0.311 −1.094 −1.176 −0.471 −0.436 −0.115 −0.479 −0.253 −0.334
SRHS = 3 dummy 0.458c 0.158d 0.703d 0.588c 2.940c 0.983c −0.034 0.015 0.244c 0.080d
−3.029 −2.367 −2.164 −5.876 −3.34 −3.764 (−0.583) −1.126 −2.711 −2.548
SRHS = 4 dummy 0.058 0.788d −0.476e 0.806e 0.115 3.484c −0.109d 0.063 −0.006 0.407c
−0.449 −2.267 (−1.664) −1.716 −0.153 −2.652 (−2.137) −0.995 (−0.080) −2.598
N 1467.000 3159.000 226.000 1495.000 1467.000 3159.000 226.000 1495.000 1467.000 3159.000
Chi-squared b 202.971 359.521 226.073 467.421 192.599 356.474
R-squared b 0.472 0.334 0.178 0.024
P-stat b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.082 0.000 0.000
Puding panel data. OLS: sample restricted to those who received reimbursement; Probit, Tobit: sample restricted to those who sought treatment. All specifications include controls for sex, age, education, marital status,
minority status, farmer status, household size, village, place of diagnostic and type of treatment used this year. SRHS = self-reported health status, see Table 2. a: Transfer refers to income received under any local or
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opportunity to study the mechanisms which determine
the pro-poor nature of a health insurance scheme.
The drawback of having such high quality data is the
limited representativeness. Our sample is only represen-
tative of a small area, and we make no claims to external
validity. In an ideal world, we would have such data for
the entire country, rather than a group of villages, enab-
ling us to evaluate NCMS nationally. However, such data
is not available and cannot be collected ex-post. Other
available surveys tend to have other issues, related to the
representativeness of rural areas (NCMS is only a rural
program), panel continuity, information at the member
level etc. In addition, NCMS implementation and re-
forms differ somewhat among provinces, which compli-
cates evaluation at the higher scale. For our purposes, a
perfectly representative dataset for a small region is a
more effective choice.
Continued analysis of panel datasets such as the one
we use has the potential to elucidate the conditions
under which health insurance policies can reach their
equity goals. Our results only partially answer this ques-
tion, and should be interpreted with caution. A cause of
concern is that we cannot assess the degree to which
epidemiology plays a role in generating our results: post-
reform years could appear different because of the particu-
lar illnesses that were prevalent in those years, not because
of the reform itself. Medical records would be necessary
to rule out such explanations. In general, clinical informa-
tion would help us explain why lower-income households
have more equal access to reimbursements after the re-
form. A well-designed pro-poor insurance scheme should
arguably never favor higher incomes regardless of shifts in
disease patterns.
Conclusions
Reducing medical impoverishment and inequality are
part of the stated goals of the NCMS. Finding out
whether a policy is pro-poor presents many challenges,
and understanding how it is meeting those goals is even
more challenging. We are able to provide some answers
by using a unique dataset from Puding county, and tak-
ing advantage of program reforms. Our results suggest
that while the early version of NCMS favored higher-
income households in our sample, the program became
more progressive after the 2009 reform. Such results are
highly relevant to the debate over health insurance.
A widely held view argues that the poor need to be pro-
tected against medical impoverishment triggered by cata-
strophic illnesses or accidents. In that spirit, NCMS started
as a program that covered hospitalizations. However, our
results suggest that, in our sample, NCMS favored higher
incomes until it allowed for the reimbursement of out-
patient services. We also show that the reform likelyanswered a significant pent-up demand for insurance of
chronic conditions. The most essential insurance needs
of the poor lie perhaps not in catastrophic illnesses, but
rather in the small and regular medical expenditures.
Our results also speak to the issue of cash constraints
and access to medical services. The 2009 reforms imple-
mented simultaneous reimbursement, partly alleviating
the financial burden associated with medical care. While
the post-reform NCMS reimbursements appear unrelated
to income in our results, households that are in debt still
fail to benefit as much as those who are not. More reforms
may be necessary to create a scheme which does not dis-
advantage the cash-poor.
Next steps in this research must further disentangle the
different aspects of the NCMS rules and reforms (breadth
of coverage, depth of coverage, etc.), to figure out which
particular provisions are most crucial to the progressive
nature of the policy. Longer panel datasets and detailed
medical records will likely be necessary to deepen our un-
derstanding of the results we present in this paper.
Inequality in access to medical care is a serious issue
common to all countries. Beyond the obvious implications
for China’s government, this research has high relevance
in the debate over publicly-sponsored health insurance.
Understanding how to make health insurance pro-poor
may be one of the keys to dismantling the vicious circle of
poverty and ill-health.
Endnotes
1The “New” Cooperative Medical Scheme is related to
the “Rural Cooperative Medical Systems” (RCMS) which
were encouraged in the 60’s and 70’s but abandoned dur-
ing market economic reforms (Singer Babiarz et al.
2010). The Chinese government had been working on
re-instating a rural insurance scheme since the mid-
nineties [40].
2The data was jointly collected by the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Chinese
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou
University.
3The official poverty rate may differ from year to year.
It was 668 RMB in 2004, about 188 USD in PPP terms
(using the 3.55 private consumption conversion factor
published by the World Bank, 2015). It was raised to
693 RMB(2006), 1196 RMB (2009) and 2300 RMB
(2011), reflecting not only inflation but also changes in
definition. We use the 2004 poverty line to ensure
comparability.
4It is interesting to note that the participation rate,
while very high, decreased by three percentage points
between 2009 and 2011. Unfortunately, we have no way
of knowing why this 3 % failed to renew their enroll-
ment. Plausible explanations could be that they did not
want to pay the 30 Yuan fee, that they did not know they
Filipski et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:210 Page 12 of 13needed to renew membership, or that they were procras-
tinating. It could also be that the enrollment drive was
less active in 2011. Regardless, at these levels of enroll-
ment we are not too worried about selection bias driving
our results. (We still control for enrollment as a
precaution).
5The decisions to seek medical care or to become a
member of NCMS raise bias and endogeneity questions
which are not our concern here.
6Outcomes are almost identical if we restrict to
treatment-seekers enrolled in NCMS, to all enrolled in
NCMS, or use the full sample, suggesting that self-
selection mechanisms are not a major force at play in
our sample.
7Previous-year and current-year debt variables all yield
similar results. The results are also robust to using the
amount of debt owed or the ratio of indebtedness in
place of a debt dummy.
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